Environmental change can lead decision makers to shift rapidly among different 49 behavioral regimes. These behavioral shifts can be accompanied by rapid changes in 50 the firing pattern of neural networks. However, it is unknown what the populations 51 of neurons that participate in such "network reset" phenomena are representing. 52
network resets (Karlsson et al., 2012) . Second, we generalized this notion of 138 representational change across pairs of non-consecutive trials using 139 representational similarity analysis (RSA) (Nili et al., 2014) . Third, we formalized a 140 set of candidate computational explanations for network-reset phenomena and 141 allowed these explanations to compete to explain multivariate brain activity (Kragel 142 et al., 2018) . 143 We observed rapid changes in multivariate activity patterns across 144 widespread cortical regions during periods of uncertainty and rapid learning. Using 145 RSA, we showed that patterns in motor regions were best described as reflecting 146 behavioral policy, patterns of activation in occipital regions were best described as 147
registering the occurrence of change-points, and patterns across much of the rest of 148 the cortex appeared to reflect uncertainty. However, patterns of activation in a small 149 number of regions including OFC were most consistent with dynamic latent state 150
representations, suggesting a possible role for the OFC in translating learning 151 signals into state changes that effectively disengage from behaviors learned in 152 contexts that are no longer relevant. 153 154 155
Results 156
To examine how neural signals change during periods of uncertainty we re-157 analyzed data from a previously published study that included recordings of fMRI 158 BOLD signal and behavioral responses of human participants in a predictive 159 inference task (McGuire et al., 2014) . Participants played a video game in which they 160 tried to get as many coins as possible (redeemable for money) by catching bags of 161 coins dropped from a hidden helicopter in the sky. Thus, on each task trial, 162 participants estimated the state of an unobservable variable (the position of a 163 helicopter) based on the history of an observable variable (the position of bags 164 dropped from that helicopter) (McGuire et al., 2014). The task included abrupt 165 change points at which the position of the helicopter was resampled from a uniform 166 distribution, which forced participants to rapidly revise beliefs about the helicopter 167 location in order to maintain successful task performance. Here we refer to periods 168 of consistent helicopter position as contexts (Fig 1a) , such that the task could be 169 described as requiring dynamic belief updating both within (Fig 1a; vertical) and 170 across (Fig 1a; horizontal) beliefs to new information (e.g., bag locations), which can be expressed in terms of a 205 dynamic learning rate (Fig 1c, green) . We sought to identify relationships between 206 the sensitivity of behavior to incoming information (i.e., learning rate) and the 207 sensitivity of neural representations to the same information. 208
The trial-to-trial dissimilarity in multivariate voxel activation patterns was 209 related to the dynamic learning rates prescribed by the normative model (Fig 1d) . 210
Trial wise neural dissimilarity was computed for each pair of sequentially adjacent 211 trials using a whole brain searchlight procedure and regressed onto an explanatory 212 matrix that included model-based estimates of dynamic learning rates. A 213 constellation of regions showed patterns of activation that changed more rapidly 214 during periods of rapid learning after change points (Fig 1e) . These regions included 215
OFC, but also clusters in dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC), occipital cortex, and the 216 temporal lobe. Thus, with a simple measure of representational change, we 217 identified neural signals whose representations updated more rapidly during 218 periods of learning in multiple brain regions (cf. (Karlsson et al., 2012) ). 219 We next exploited representational similarity analysis (RSA) to extend and 220 generalize the analysis above by incorporating information about the pairwise 221 dissimilarity for all pairs of trials, not merely adjacent trial pairs. We hypothesized 222 that the dissimilarity in neural representation for any pair of trials would depend on 223 the cumulative amount of learning expected to occur between them under the 224 normative model (see Methods). The hypothesized pattern of dissimilarity across 225 trials is equivalent to what we would expect from a latent state representation that 226
shifted rapidly at abrupt context transitions and concomitant periods of rapid 227
learning, but remained relatively stable in periods when the statistics of the 228 environment were stationary (Fig 2a) . The pattern of dissimilarities predicted 229 across adjacent trials using this strategy is exactly equivalent to the learning rates 230 that served as the explanatory variable in the previous analysis (Fig 2b) , but this 231 generalization also makes predictions about the pattern of dissimilarities that would 232 be observed across non-adjacent trials (Fig 2c) . We used a searchlight to identify 233 brain regions in which the neural dissimilarity matrix was positively associated with 234 this hypothetical "shifting state representation" hypothesis matrix while controlling 235 for fixed autocorrelation in the similarity structure (see Methods). A significant 236 association was observed in a set of regions that overlapped with the results from 237 the trial-wise dissimilarity analysis, including clusters in OFC, DMFC, occipital, and 238 temporal regions (Fig 2d) . As might be expected by the increased power owing to 239 the non-adjacent trial comparisons afforded by RSA analysis, we also identified 240 additional regions that were not clearly indicated by our previous analysis including 241 a number of visual regions, left motor cortex, and bilateral hippocampus (Fig 2d) . 242 243 244 245 
258
We next sought to arbitrate among multiple possible causes for the varying 259
rates of representational change. The rapid evolution of neural representations after 260 change points might reflect different underlying computations in different brain 261
regions. Our analysis focused on four candidate computations that could all 262 theoretically drive network reset-like phenomena. 263
First, we considered the possibility that a brain region might reflect the 264 behavioral policy of the participant. In our experimental task, the behavioral policy 265 was reported directly by positioning a bucket at the predicted location (using a 266 joystick) on each trial. For a given helicopter position, participants tended to place 267 the bucket in a similar location, but changes in helicopter location corresponded to 268 large changes in the bucket placement, which would correspond to abrupt 269 transitions in a representation of behavioral policy after change points (Fig 3a) . 270
Occasionally, a new helicopter position was similar to one that had previously been 271 encountered, such that a similar behavioral policy might be employed in two 272 temporally separated contexts (Fig 3a; contexts 1&3). during which learning from prior contexts should be discounted to minimize 307 interference (Fig 1a) . Since the helicopter position cannot be resolved exactly, such 308 a context representation would be expected to evolve over time in proportion to the 309 rate of learning about the current context. As described in Figure 2 , this would lead 310
to latent state representations that change rapidly at change points and immediately 311 afterwards and change only minimally during periods of prolonged stability ( Fig  312  3d ). Unlike the other computational factors discussed above, a latent state 313
representation would not necessarily exhibit any systematic similarity relation 314 between one context and another -as our task did not include situations in which 315 the helicopter returned exactly to a previously occupied position. Such a latent state 316 signal might provide an evolving substrate to which outcomes could be linked in 317 order to achieve rational adjustments of learning. 318
Each of these representations would yield more rapid changes in neural 319 patterns after change points in our task, and indeed, they make very similar 320 predictions for how neural dissimilarity metrics between adjacent trials should 321 evolve over time (Fig 3 middle differences between high relative uncertainty and other trials, and shifting latent 337 states capture differences largely near the diagonal (Fig 3, middle column, bottom) . 338 Consistent with these qualitative differences, correlations between the hypothesis 339 matrices for the different candidate representations were relatively low (all 340 pairwise r < 0.16), suggesting that the candidate representations could be efficiently 341 distinguished when considering the entire pairwise dissimilarity matrix. 342 We exploited these distinct predictions using a representational similarity 343 analysis approach that allowed alternative explanations of representational change 344 to compete to explain the observed neural dissimilarity matrix. Neural dissimilarity 345
was computed for each pair of trials as one minus the spatial correlation of trial-346 activations across voxels in a searchlight and regressed onto an explanatory matrix 347 that included the hypothesis matrices for all four candidate representations, along 348 with a number of other explanatory terms designed to account for factors changing 349 throughout the task and simple sources of variability such as autocorrelation (see Table 1 ). Representations of change-point probability were 356 prominent in occipital cortex and precuneus ( Figure 3b ; Table 1 ). Representations 357 of relative uncertainty were widespread across the brain and included DMFC, 358 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral parietal cortices, insula, as well as some 359 occipital and temporal regions (Figure 3c , right). Patterns of activation consistent 360 with a latent state that shifts according to assessment of the current context were 361 prominent in OFC and temporal cortex (Fig 3d, right ; Table 1 ). 362
The relationship between the neural dissimilarity in OFC and the 363 dissimilarity structure predicted by a shifting latent state signal was robust to 364 specific analysis choices. Patterns of activation in right and left OFC clusters were 365 positively related to shifting latent state predictions in the context of our 366
representational similarity regression analysis when using alternative pre-367 processing strategies such as omitting smoothing (Table 2) or including a spatial 368 pre-whitening procedure ( Table 3) , both of which emphasize the high frequency 369
components of the spatial pattern (Walther et al., 2016) . The observed effects were 370 not driven by relationships between additional explanatory variables included in 371 the regression model, as exclusion of other explanatory variables yielded very 372 similar relationships (Table 4 ). It is noteworthy that this was not true of all clusters 373 that survived whole-brain correction in our representational similarity regression 374 analysis; clusters identified in left superior parietal lobule and right occipital cortex 375
were not related to the shifting latent state predictions in isolation (Table 4) . 376 Furthermore, the relationship between shifting latent state predictions and OFC 377 patterns of activation was also robust to our assumptions about the exact timing of 378 learning; a time shifted version of the shifting latent state hypothesis matrix that 379 assumed learning occurred immediately upon observing a trial outcome could also 380 describe similarity patterns observed in right and left OFC (Table 5) . 381
In summary, while we found a number of regions that showed rapidly 382 changing representations during periods of uncertainty following a context change, 383 these reset-like phenomena were due to dissociable computational explanations. 384 While a few regions were implicated in representing behavioral policy or change-385 point probability, most of these regions reflected relative uncertainty, and a smaller 386 subset of regions including OFC were consistent with representing a latent state that 387
is adjusted according to changes in context. 388 389
Discussion 390 391
Neural representations in rodent medial frontal cortex rapidly change during 392 periods of uncertainty (Karlsson et al., 2012 ). Here we demonstrate, in the context 393 of a dynamic learning task, that such rapid representational changes are present in 394 the BOLD signal in widespread cortical and subcortical regions. Furthermore, we 395
showed that these rapid representational changes are consistent with several 396 different computational explanations, which could be teased apart by considering 397 the similarity structure of non-adjacent trials through representational similarity 398 analysis. 399
Our analyses revealed distinct explanations for rapid representational 400 changes in different brain regions. Focal representations of behavioral policy and 401 change-point probability were identified in motor and visual cortex respectively, 402
while widespread representations of relative uncertainty were observed throughout 403 the brain. In addition, a small number of brain areas including the OFC had patterns 404 of activation consistent with a form of shifting latent state representation that could 405 speed disengagement from well-learned responses in a changing context. 406
Perhaps most straightforwardly, our analysis revealed that left motor cortex 407 contained representations consistent with behavioral policy. In our task, this policy 408 was completely concordant with the physical movement necessary to implement 409 the behavioral policy. Thus, we interpret these results as a consequence of our 410 experimental design, which required subjects to provide an analog behavioral 411 output of their behavioral policy with their right hand on each task trial. Thus, this 412 result was likely driven, at least in part, by a univariate effect of movement 413 magnitude in the contralateral motor cortex. 414 Two other computations that we identified using this approach, change-point 415 probability and relative uncertainty, had been the focus of a previous paper using 416 this same dataset (McGuire et al., 2014). In the case of change-point probability, 417 both univariate and RSA analyses revealed occipital cortex and precuneus as the 418 locus of neural representation (see Figure 2c and (McGuire et al., 2014) ). However, 419
relative uncertainty representations identified using RSA were considerably more 420 widespread than those identified through univariate activations (see Figure 2c and 421 (McGuire et al., 2014) ). This broader set of areas included some regions that were 422 activated in the univariate analysis (e.g., DMFC), some that were deactivated in the 423 univariate analysis (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex), and some that were not 424 identified in univariate analyses at all (e.g., temporal cortex Representations of latent state that transition dynamically from one context 461 to the next are similar in spirit to the concept of event segmentation in episodic 462 memory (Ezzyat and Davachi, 2010) . Segmenting events is useful in that it can allow 463 memories that are embedded within the same event but separated in time to share 464 associations, while memories that may be closer in time but embedded in separate 465 events are maintained separately, preventing interference (Reynolds et al., 2007) . 466 One mechanism through which segmentation could be achieved involves dynamic 2014). However, aspects of our findings also raise questions about the extent of this 473 link. While our results could be interpreted as supporting roles for OFC and 474 temporal lobe in segmenting contexts, we did not observe the same phenomenon in 475 the hippocampus, which is thought to play a key role in event segmentation (Ezzyat 476 and Davachi, 2014; Hsieh et al., 2014; Shapiro, 2014) . Instead, we found that 477
representations in hippocampus, like many other brain regions, were best explained 478 as representing uncertainty itself. One potentially relevant detail is that previous 479 contexts were not systematically re-visited in our task, reducing demands for 480 episodic retrieval. An interesting avenue for future work would be to examine how 481 the representations we identified respond when the context abruptly returns to a 482 previously encountered state, such as might require a form of mental time travel for 483 successful performance (Manning et al., 2011) . 484
Our results, especially regarding the OFC, demonstrate the utility of 485
analyzing the representational similarity of multi-voxel patterns of activity in 486 concert with computational modeling. Such an approach allowed us to identify 487 neural representations consistent with a specific computational role for OFC, which 488 in principle could not have been isolated in our task with univariate activation or 489 multivariate classification analyses. 490
In summary, we show that shifts in the statistics of the environment during a 491 dynamic learning task induced both elevated learning and changes in neural 492
representation. These changes in neural representation were attributed to specific 493 computations using RSA. Our results identified widespread representations of 494 relative uncertainty throughout the brain, together with more focal representations 495 of change-point probability and behavioral policy. In addition, a small number of 496 brain areas including the OFC had patterns of activation consistent with a shifting 497 latent state representation that could speed unlearning of irrelevant information in 498 a changing context. 499 500 501
Methods 502 503 504
Behavioral task and analysis 505 506
For details of the behavioral task and data analysis, see our previous report 507
( McGuire et al., 2014) . Briefly, 32 human subjects performed a computerized 508 predictive inference task in an MRI scanner while undergoing functional 509 neuroimaging. Each trial required the subject to move a bucket across the horizontal 510 axis of a screen (starting from a "home position" at the right-hand edge, using a 511 joystick controlled by the right hand) to a location that they believed most likely to 512 be underneath a helicopter that was occluded by clouds and thus not directly Data were preprocessed using AFNI (Cox, 1996; 2012) Multivariate fMRI analysis 541
Multivariate analyses were conducted in spherical searchlights (radius = 3 542 voxels) across the entire brain. Within each searchlight, the neural dissimilarity 543 between each pair of trials was computed as one minus the spatial Pearson 544 correlation between the voxel-wise activations for those trials. 545
Trial-to-trial dissimilarity scores were extracted by extracting the i=j-1 546 diagonal elements from the dissimilarity matrix, which corresponded to the 547 dissimilarity between adjacent trials (see Figure 1d ). The dissimilarity scores were 548 regressed onto an explanatory matrix containing an intercept, and dynamic learning 549 rates prescribed by a normative learning model, yielding one coefficient of interest 550 per subject, per searchlight. Dynamic learning rates were estimated as the sum of 551 change-point probability and relative uncertainty minus their product (see Figure  552 1c; (Nassar et al., 2016) ). These latent variables were estimated with a parameter-553 free normative model that took subject prediction errors as an input according to 554 the following set of recursive equations: 555 556
where ! ! is the total variance in beliefs about the helicopter location (the generative 561 mean), ! ! is the variance in the distribution of outcomes (bag drops) around that 562 mean, ! is the prediction error, and H is the hazard rate and w is the width of the 563 screen. For a full derivation of the model and terms see and for 564 a complete description of the method for estimating latent variables see (Nassar et  565 al., 2016). 566
In general, change-point probability and relative uncertainty were both 567 increased after change-points, albeit with different latencies, leading to learning 568 rates that decay slowly as a function of time within context. Learning rates 569
quantifying sensitivity to information provided on trial j were aligned with the trial-570
to-trial dissimilarity between trials j and j+1. Thus, our analysis targeted patterns of 571 activity whose degree of change between trials j and j+1 reflected normative 572 learning predicted to occur from the outcome presented on trial j. The first 3 trials 573 from each block were removed from analysis as they occurred at the onset of fMRI 574 acquisition. 575
Trial-to-trial dissimilarity analysis described above could be thought of as a 576 special case of the general idea that the similarity between each pair of trials might 577 be inversely related to the learning done between them. Because this pattern of 578 similarity is what might be expected to emerge from a representation of the latent 579 task state, which transitions abruptly from one context to the next and remains 580 relatively stable after many trials in a well learned context, we will refer to it as the 581
shifting latent state dissimilarity matrix. The hypothesis matrix for shifting latent 582 states was generated by computing the extent to which the inference on trial i would 583 factor into the inference on trial j, assuming normative learning: 584 585
where H is the shifting latent state dissimilarity matrix and α is the learning rate 586
prescribed by a normative model , such that more prescribed 587 learning between two trials corresponded to higher values of α, a smaller product 588 term, and thus a greater dissimilarity. The i=j-1 diagonal of this matrix is 1-(1-α t ), or 589 just α t, and thus equivalent to the vector of trial-to-trial dissimilarities described 590 above. However, the shifting latent state hypothesis matrix also includes 591 information about other elements in the matrix, potentially offering a more 592 powerful construct to ask a similar question. We examined whether this similarity 593 structure was reflected in the neural dissimilarity between trials in each spherical 594 searchlight. The lower triangle of the neural dissimilarity matrix was regressed onto 595 a hypothesis matrix that included an intercept, the shifting latent state hypothesis 596 matrix (lower triangle), and 15 dummy variables designed to remove the influence 597 of autocorrelation on the coefficient of interest. These autocorrelation terms were 598 derived from 15 off-diagonal binary matrices in which a single off diagonal (i = j-1; i 599 = j-2; i = j-3… i = j-15) was set to one. These matrices were constructed to account 600 for any variance in the neural dissimilarity matrices that could be explained by a 601 46:681-692 .  751   752   753  754  755  756  757  758  759  760  761  762  763  764  765  766  767  768  769  770  771  772  773  774  775  776  777  778  779  780  781  782  783  784  785  786  787  788  789  790  791  792  793  794  795  796  797  798  799  800  801  802  Table 1 : Peak voxel locations corresponding to behavioral policy, relative uncertainty, changepoint probability and shifting latent state representations. Cluster size (in voxels), maximum (tstatistic) and MNI coordinates for each cluster surviving multiple comparisons correction. Table 3 : Regions-of-interest that showed a significant effect of shifting latent state, reanalyzed with unsmoothed voxels that were spatial pre-whitened (Walther et al., 2016) . Left occipital pole 0.0426 3.08 .00435 Table 5 : Shifting latent state effect in ROIs sensitive to shifting latent state, re-analyzed using a time-shifted "shifting latent state" regressor in which representations at the time of outcome on a given trial are modeled as reflecting the beliefs that will guide behavior on the subsequent trial. This is offset by one trial from our original analysis, which assumed that representations upon viewing an outcome would reflect the beliefs that were formed in anticipation of that outcome, rather than the updated ones that incorporated it.
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